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Measuring Up: Do the Palestinian
Homelands Constitute a Valid State
Under International Law?
I. Introduction
On November 15, 1988, the Palestine Liberation Organization's
(PLO) governing body, the Palestine National Committee, issued a
declaration of independence for the Israeli-occupied West Bank and
Gaza Strip.' In addition, the PLO accepted United Nations Security
Council Resolution 242, and in doing so, implicitly accepted co-exis-
tence with Israel.2 As a result of the November 15 declaration, con-
troversy has arisen over whether the Palestinian Homelands consti-
tute a valid state under international law.
The "traditional" definition of a "state" as adopted by the Mon-
tevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States requires that
the state as "person" under international law must possess: (a) a
permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) a government; and
(d) the capacity to enter into relations with other states.' Should the
Palestinian Homelands be found to possess these qualifications for
statehood, there remains further disagreement over whether this
alone is enough to qualify as a state. There is considerable conten-
tion among writers as to whether recognition is declaratory or consti-
tutive; that is, whether a state, possessing the necessary qualifica-
tions, exists prior to recognition or whether it is brought into being
by the act of recognition.' This Note concludes that the Palestinian
Homelands possess the necessary qualifications for statehood. Fur-
thermore, recognition is a declaratory act, unnecessary to bring a
state into existence. In view of these facts, this Note asserts that the
Palestinian Homelands constitute a state under international law.
I. Friedman, Egypt Looks to U.S. for Next Move to Nudge Israel Toward Talks,
Christian Sci. Mon., Nov. 16, 1988, at 7, col. 1.
2. Id. (citing S.C. Res. 242, 22 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Res. & Dec.) at 8-9, U.N. Doc. S/
INF/22/Rev. 2 (1967)).
3. 1 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 284 (2d ed. 1970) (citing the Montevideo
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1, 49 Stat. 3097, 165
L.N.T.S. 19, 25).
4. P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 43 (1948).
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II. The Requirements of Statehood
A. A Permanent Population
In satisfaction of the requirements of statehood, the territories
of the West Bank and Gaza Strip remain predominantly Palestin-
ian.6 This permanent population strongly supports the PLO and the
declaration of independence. 6 The Palestinians constitute a "people,"
united in their goal of an independent Palestinian State. 7 The Pales-
tinians view the declaration as a method to translate their uprising
against Israeli-rule into tangible political gains.8 On the date mark-
ing the uprising's twelfth month, Palestinians showed their support
for both the uprising and the declaration with a general strike: they
blocked roads, closed businesses and displayed outlawed national
flags.9
B. A Defined Territory
The West Bank and the Gaza Strip form the territory of the
new Palestinian State.10 While it may be argued that the territory is
not under Palestinian control, Israel's claim to the territory is dis-
puted as well. United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 calls
for Israel's withdrawal from these and other Arab lands it militarily
occupied in 1967, in exchange for peace." Every nation, including
the United States, has declared that the territories occupied by
Israel in the 1967 war are "occupied territories" in both a factual
and legal sense.'" Israel alone declares that these territories are "lib-
erated."' 3 The PLO has abandoned the Palestine National Charter's
call for Israel's destruction, yet Israel remains opposed to a two-state
solution to the Arab/Israeli conflict.'
4
5. Friedlander, The PLO and the Rule of Law: A Reply to Dr. Anis Kassim, 10 DEN.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 221, 231 (1981).
6. See Moffett, Palestinians Set to Declare Territories Independent, Christian Sci.
Mon., Nov. 10, 1988, at I, col. I. "The declaration comes in response to pressures from resi-
dents of the West Bank and Gaza." Id.
7. Friedlander, supra note 5, at 230. "A 'people' consists of a community of individuals
bound together by mutual loyalties, an identifiable tradition, and a common cultural aware-
ness, with historic ties to a given territory. Their collective behavior is based upon the pursuit
and implementation of specific goals which give the community at large a group identity and a
shared sense of values." Id.
8. Moffett, supra note 6, at 29, col. I.
9. Id.
10. See text accompanying notes 1-2.
II. Friedman, supra note 1, at 7, col. I (citing S.C. Res. 242, 22 U.N. SCOR, Supp.
(Res. & Dec.) 8-9, U.N. Doc. S/INF/22/REV. 2 (1967)).
12. Kassim, A Response to Professor Robert A. Friedlander, 10 DEN. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 237, 239 (1981).
13. Id.
14. Moffett, Political Program Transforms Basis for Dealing With Israel, PLO Sources
Say, Christian Sci. Mon., Nov. 16, 1988, at 7, col. 2; Houk, World Backing is Key for Newly
Independent State, Christian Sci. Mon., Nov. 10, 1988, at 9, col. 1.
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Arguments have been put forward that the PLO, recognized as
the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, does
not control any defined territory and therefore, cannot claim author-
ity or status as the government of the Palestinian State. 5 Official
control over a territory, however, is not a decisive criterion for state-
hood." The American experience in Vietnam is an excellent exam-
ple. The United States forces were in control of the territory of
South Vietnam, while the Viet Cong was in full control of the popu-
lation."7 As Israel's contested admission into the United Nations
shows, this still may not prevent an entity from becoming a member,
though the existence of one of the traditional qualifications of state-
hood may be in dispute." Although the criteria for United Nations
membership are not identical with the criteria for Statehood, one
requirement is that the applicant be a state. 9 In admitting members
to the United Nations, the extent of population and territory seems
to be of less significance in practice than the degree of autonomy and
the stability of government.2 0
C. Government
The PLO, from both factual and judicial perspectives, is the le-
gitimate successor to the Arab Higher Committee and subsequently
the Government of All Palestine, and thus the sole and legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people.2' The PLO exercises powers
that can only be implemented by governmental authorities. These
powers are manifested in various forms such as extradition powers
and taxation authority.
2
15. Kassim, The Palestine Liberation Organization's Claim to Status: A Juridical
Analysis Under International Law, 9 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POCY 1, 29-30 (1980) (citing 30
U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/INF/31, at 7 (1975)). "The successive resolutions passed by
United Nations organs reflect and emphasize the world community's view that the PLO is the
sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The most significant development
in this regard is the Security Council's decision, taken first in 1975, to invite the PLO to
participate in its discussions as if it were a United Nations member state." Id.
16. Id. at 28.
17. Id.
18. D. O'CONNELL, supra note 3, at 287. "The Arab States objected to Israel's member-
ship on the ground of doubt as to defined territory . Id.
19. P. JESSUP, supra note 4, at 47.
20. D. O'CONNELL, supra note 3, at 285.
21. See Kassim, supra note 15, at 15-18. Kassim outlines the development of the Gov-
ernment of All Palestine and, its successor, the Arab Higher Committee until the Committee
itself was succeeded by the PLO in 1964.
22. Id. at 24. "The official policy proclaimed by the PLO with regard to plane hijacking
is that it is a crime punishable under the Palestine Penal Code . . . . [I]n November 1974,
eleven men hijacked a British Airways jet in Dubai, later surrendering in Tunis. These hijack-
ers were ultimately turned over to the PLO which later announced that it had inflicted severe
punishment on them." Id. at 24, n.133. "However, [lt is regarded that El-Al Israel Airlines is
a military institution and that all its pilots are military reserve officers." Id. at 25. "The PLO
exercises tax powers whereby, directly and indirectly, it levies taxes on Palestinians working in
various countries." Several Arab countries have laws deducting 3-6% of the monthly salaries
Winter .1990]
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Internally, the PLO has structured itself as a government in
process.2 3 The Palestine National Charter and its Fundamental Law
have modeled PLO institutions after those of established govern-
ments.2 ' The Palestine National Committee serves as the "Palestine
Parliament" With supreme legislative authority.2 5 The Executive
Committee is the "Palestine Cabinet" which has various depart-
ments and agencies to serve Palestinian values. 6 The Political De-
partment, with PLO offices in various countries acting as "embas-
sies," serves as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Military
Department serves as the Ministry of Defense, in charge of all mili-
tary operations including regular troops, guerrillas, and the purchase
and manufacture of weapons.2 8 The Palestine National Fund is simi-
lar to a Ministry of Finance and National Economy. 29 The Depart-
ment of Information, in charge of the PLO newspapers, radio sta-
tions, and news agency, and the Departments of Education, Social
Affairs, Research and Planning, Health, and Occupied Territories
also exist. 30
In addition, the Palestine National Congress created a judiciary
by means of the Revolutionary Court Order under the PLO.31 The
Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee set up the Revolution-
ary Penal Code, the Revolutionary Code of Criminal Procedures,
and the Revolutionary Rehabilitation Code in 1979, which apply to
all Palestinian people.32
While the title "government" appears to be more prestigious
than "organization," it is the basis of the power and authority exer-
cised that is the crucial criterion, not the title.33 The PLO acts as the
government of the Palestinian State. Compared to its predecessors,
the Arab Higher Committee and the Government of All Palestine,
the PLO has established an unprecedented level of authority and
representation. 4 As previously mentioned, it exercises typical gov-
ernmental powers, has established social controls, and exercises polit-
ical power over the Palestinian people both in and outside the West
of Palestinians working in their countries for payment to the Palestine National Fund. Id.




27. Id. at 27.
28. Id. at 26.
29. Id. at 27.
30. Id.
31. Id. At its sixth session, held in 1969, the Palestine National Congress resolved to
create the Revolutionary Court Order under the PLO. Id.
32. Id. The codes are applied to all resistance groups of the PLO as well as "to all
sectors of the Palestine People." Id.
33. Id. at 32.
34. Kassim, supra note 15, at 15-18.
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Bank and Gaza Strip territory."3 According to existing legal norms,
a nation "is a community of peoples, adhering to a single sover-
eignty, accepting mutually binding authority structures and occupy-
ing a given territory within ascertainable geographic boundaries.
This collective entity, upon exercising political power and establish-
ing social controls, becomes a nation-state . . . .,3 Thus the occu-
pants of the Palestinian Homelands, and their government, the PLO,
as a collective entity, meet the qualifications of a nation-state.
D. Capacity to Enter into Relations with Other States
While a state may be admitted to the United Nations regardless
of some disputed qualifications of statehood, the decisive legal crite-
rion governing the attitude towards admission has been the capacity
to conduct foreign affairs. 37 The PLO, as government of the Palestin-
ian State, possesses this capacity. After being granted permanent ob-
server status by the United Nations in 1974, the General Assembly
called for the invitation of the PLO "to participate in all efforts,
deliberations and conferences on the Middle East which are held
under the auspices of the United Nations, on an equal footing with
other parties ... ."38
The United Nations Security Council invited the PLO in 1975
to participate in its discussion concerning the Israeli raids on Pales-
tinian refugee camps in Lebanon. 9 The invitation was extended to
the PLO as if it were a member state in accordance with rule 37 and
not on the basis of rule 39 of the Security Council rules of proce-
dure.' 0 Rule 37 applies to "[a]ny member of the United Nations
which is not a member of the Security Council . . .;" whereas rule
39 applies to "persons."' 1 The Security Council again invited the
PLO to participate under rule 37 in 1976 and 1978 in discussions
concerning the Middle East situation."2
In March 1978, after Israel invaded Lebanon to uproot PLO
bases, the PLO showed its ability to conduct foreign affairs and ful-
35. See text accompanying notes 21-32.
36. Friedlander, supra note 5, at 230.
37. D. O'CONNELL, supra note 3, at 288.
38. Friedlander, supra note 5, at 233 n. 71 (citing G.A. Res. 3237, 29 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 31) 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974)). See also Kassim, supra note 15, at 29 (citing
G.A. Res. 3375, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 3, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975)).
39. Kassim, supra note 15, at 20.
40. Id. (citing 30 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/INF/31, at 7 (1975)).
41. id.
42. Id. The decision to invite the PLO to participate in the debate was adopted in 1976
by 11 votes to I (the United States), with 3 abstentions. Id. at 2, n.2 (citing 30 U.N. SCOR,
U.N. Doc. S/INF/32, at 1 (1976)). When the Council convened on Mar. 19, 1978, to discuss
Israel's invasion of southern Lebanon, the PLO was invited to participate at the request of
Kuwait. At the suggestion of the United States representative, the Kuwaiti proposal was put to
a vote and was adopted 10 votes to 1, with 4 abstentions. Id. at 2, n.2 (citing U.N. Chronicle,
Apr. 1978, at 6).
Winter 1990]
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fill international obligations as is required of a sovereign state.4" The
Chairman of the PLO's Executive Committee was able to agree to
and enforce the United Nations Secretary General's appeal for a
general cease-fire."" Israel's Chief of Staff admitted in a Jerusalem
Post interview that the success of the United Nations interim forces
in the territory depended upon the PLO's acceptance of the cease-
fire. 5 This amounts to an admission of the PLO's ability to fulfill
international obligations.
The Arab League Council accepted Palestine, represented by
the PLO, as a full member of the Arab League, equal to all other
members, in 1976.48 The Arab League is a regional political organi-
zation concerned with the collective security and the preservation of
the political independence and territorial integrity of member
states.47 The-PLO's admittance as a full member represents a signifi-
cant legal development of the PLO's status under public interna-
tional law.4 8 It further illustrates that as government of the State of
Palestine, the PLO possesses the capacity to conduct foreign affairs.
In addition, the PLO is a member of several international insti-
tutions established to serve community values."9 An example of this
is the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, established
in 1974 by eighteen sovereign states for the purpose of financing eco-
nomic development schemes in Africa.5" The multilateral treaty con-
stituting the Bank granted it the status of "an international institu-
tion enjoying full international legal status."'51 Palestine, represented
by the PLO, was admitted as a Bank member with the powers ac-
corded to other member governments.5"
The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development was con-
stituted in 1968."1 By Decree No. 4 of 1976, the Fund's Board of
43. Id. See also D. O'CONNELL, supra note 3, at 285. It is clearly the intention of the
United Nations Charter "that only fully sovereign states possessed of capacity to fulfill the
obligations of membership are qualified for admission." Id.
44. Kassim, supra note 15, at 24.
45. id. (citing Jerusalem Post, Mar. 31, 1978, at 1, cols. 1-4).
46. Id. at 22 (citing Doc. No. D3462/S.66/M.2-919/1976, released by the Secretariat
of the League of Arab States).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 21.
50. Id. (citing the Agreement establishing the Arab Bank for Economic Development in
Africa, art. 3, para. 1, Feb. 18, 1974 (English text released by principal office of the Bank, at
Khartoum, Sudan)).
51. Id.
52. Id. The PLO, representing Palestine, was also admitted as a full member to the
Arab Monetary Fund. The Fund was created in 1976 pursuant to an agreement among the
governments of twenty-one Arab countries, primarily for the purpose of rectifying deficits in
the balance of payments of members states. Id. (citing the Articles of Agreement of the Arab
Monetary Fund, art. 4(a) (official English text, Nov. 1977)).
53. Id. (citing the Agreement Establishing the Arab Fund for Economic and Social De-
velopment, May 16, 1968 (English text released by Head Office of the Fund, at Kuwait)).
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Governors admitted Palestine, represented by the PLO, as a full-
fledged member." "By virtue of Decree No. 6 of 1976, the Board of
Governors, having considered [article] 12 of the Agreement estab-
lishing the Fund, resolved that the 'Fund accept the guarantee of the
[PLO] to loans granted to finance projects in the Palestinian terri-
tory . . .' "" Article 12 provides, in part, that all lending transac-
tions granted by the Fund to any public or private entity "shall be
guaranteed by the [g]overnment" of the state or country in which
the project will be initiated.5' Therefore, the Board of Governors rec-
ognized the PLO as the equivalent of a "government."
As has been demonstrated, the Palestinian Homelands, pos-
sessed of the traditional qualifications of a permanent population, de-
fined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations
with other states, may qualify as a sovereign state under interna-
tional law.57 Once in possession of these qualifications, it remains to
be seen whether this alone is enough for an entity to qualify as a
state, or whether recognition is necessary to bring a state into being.
III. Recognition is Declaratory
There is no general consensus held by the international commu-
nity that recognition of a state is declaratory or constitutive." There
is disagreement as to whether a state exists prior to recognition or
whether it is brought into being by the act of recognition.5 9 The split
stems from the fact that the declaratory school of thought considers
recognition a purely political act, while the constitutive school
stresses its legal character."0
Opposition to the constitutive view is based on the lack of or-
ganization of the international community, as well as the fact that
recognition is accorded at the will of established states.61 Under the
constitutive view, the established states have the power to exclude a
new aspirant to membership in the community of nations, even
though it possesses the necessary qualifications.62 Certain writers ar-
54. Id.
55. Id. (quoting the record of the Fifth Meeting of the Board of Governors of the Arab
Fund for Economic and Social Development, held at Rabat Apr. 28-29, 1976. Id. at 66-67).
56. Id. (quoting the Agreement Establishing the Arab Fund for Economic and Social
Development, May 16, 1968. (English text released by Head Office of the Fund, at Kuwait)).
57. See text accompanying notes 5-6.
58. P. JESSUP, supra note 4, at 43.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 43-44.
61. Id. at 44.
62. Id. Indeed, it has been proposed that the United Nations should be universal, all
states being members. Under this scheme, members would not independently accord recogni-
tion to new states. Rather, the criteria for admission of a new state to the United Nations, and
thus the international community, would be the traditional attributes of statehood as well as
agreement to the peaceful settlement of disputes called for by the United Nations Charter. In
this way, recognition of new states would be only by the decision of the United Nations itself.
Winter 1990]
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gue that there is a duty to recognize when an aspirant actually pos-
sesses the attributes of statehood, but there is no organized interna-
tional machinery to enforce such an obligation.6"
The constitutive school appears mistaken in its belief that a
state comes or could come into existence merely by international rec-
ognition. International recognition takes the existence of an indepen-
dent state for granted.64 Such recognition, by itself, would not be
sufficient to create a new state . 5 It has been stated that:
[tIhis is a recognized principle of international theory and prac-
tice . . . . International recognition is only a condition for the
access of a state into the international community, the state be-
comes through it a person of international law, but [it] draws its
existence from its own internal substance. Its existence is
granted at the moment in which its sovereignty has in fact been
established.6
For an entity to be a sovereign state, it must meet the tradi-
tional qualifications of statehood.6 7 Furthermore, the fully-sovereign
state is one which is not subordinate in its capacity for international
action to any other legal entity.68 However, the state today, and of
the future, is tending to become subordinate to a new type of legal
entity - the international organization.69 Thus the term "sover-
eignty" is a relative one, that when used in reference to a state
means no more than that state has plenary but not absolute compe-
tence in international law, unfettered by the constitutional constraint
of entities like itself.
70
Just what constitutes sovereignty is vague. The uncertainty of
the concept is easily demonstrated. While it is clearly the intention
of the United Nations Charter to admit only fully-sovereign states as
members, the organization has admitted nations such as Mongolia,
whose independence was in dispute at the time of its admission, and
the Congo, whose government's effectiveness, and even existence,
was in doubt.7 1 Czechoslovakia was found to have established sover-
Id. at 48-49.
63. Id. at 44. Jessup argues that there is no single established procedure for according
recognition, it may be express or implied, unilateral or joint. Recognition may take the form of
a declaration, the conclusion of a treaty, or the exchange of diplomatic representatives. Id. at
45.
64. Judgment of April 26, 1921, Supreme Administrative Court, Czech, I ANN. DIG. 15,
at 17 n.(c). [hereinafter Judgment of April 26, 1921].
65. Id.
66. Id. (quoting the Judgment of October 16, 1919, Supreme Administrative Court,
Czech).
67. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
68. D. O'CONNELL, supra note 3, at 284.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 288. The independence of Mongolia was questioned by the United States (for
a time) and by China.
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eignty over the once-Austrian district of Liberec by declaration
months before the actual occupation of the territory.72 In view of
these examples, it is clear that the Palestinian State, with its qualifi-
cations for statehood and its capacity to fulfill international obliga-
tions, has established sovereignty Under this nebulous definition.73
Therefore, having established sovereignty, the State of Palestine al-
ready exists.
Recognition is declaratory. Whether, express or implied, by
treaty or declaration, recognition merely approves a state of facts
which already exists."4 As acknowledged by the American Republics
in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States,
recognition merely signifies acceptance by the recognizing state of
the new state's personality with all the rights and duties determined
by international law. 75 In light of this fact, international recognition
is not necessary to create a Palestinian State under international
law. International recognition will merely serve to strengthen the
claim to that which already exists. Clearly, the objective of recogni-
tion is to give the state access to the international community.7"
IV. Conclusion
On November 29, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly
passed Resolution 181 which called for the partition of the British-
mandate territory of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states.77 Many
writers refer to this resolution as the legal basis for the creation of
the State of Israel, but gloss over the fact that it is the legal basis for
creating the State of Palestine as well. In the course of twenty-four
years, the PLO has taken a more moderate stance. Its declaration of
independence recognizes the State of Israel and calls for a two-state
solution to the Arab/Israeli conflict. Were Israel to recognize the
Palestinian declaration of independence, heeding United Nations Se-
curity Council Resolution 242 and withdrawing from the Palestinian
Homelands, it would be left territorially intact within pre-1967 bor-
72. Judgment of January 21, 1921, Supreme Administrative Court, Czech, I ANN. DIG.
II, at 13. The Court could not accept the contention that the National Committee, or the
Czechoslovak State, exercised sovereignty in the district of Liberec only after the occupation
thereof by the Czechoslovak military forces on December 16, 1918. Id. thereinafter Judgment
of January 21, 19211.
73. See text accompanying notes 5-56.
74. Judgment of January 21, 1921, supra note 72, at 13.
75. Judgment of April 26, 1921, supra note 64, at 17n.(c).
76. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 6, 49
Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S., 19, 25.
77. Houk, supra note 14, at 9, col. I (citing G.A. Res. 181 (Resolution Concerning the
Future Government of Palestine), U.N. Doc. A/519, at 131-32 (1946)).
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ders. International recognition should be accorded to the Palestinian
State, approving a set of facts which already exist, so that it may
take its place in the international community.
James D. Howley
